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 The foreign policy of the United States of America toward the Democratic People’s 
Republic of Korea (DPRK), commonly known as North Korea, has an important role in 
maintaining the peace, stability, and security of Eastern Asia.  From the partition of the Korean 
peninsula following World War II to the country’s development of nuclear weapons, the foreign 
policy of the U.S. had to evolve based on the circumstances in North Korea.  The United States, 
along with China, Japan, Russia, and South Korea, have key roles surrounding the discussions 
with North Korea.  The thesis focuses solely on the presidential administrations of Harry S. 
Truman, Dwight D. Eisenhower, Lyndon B. Johnson, Richard Nixon, Bill Clinton, George W. 
Bush, and Barack Obama; these men had the greatest impact on U.S. foreign policy with North 
Korea. 
The thesis takes a qualitative approach of research by using primarily government 
documents, historical records from presidential administrations, articles from foreign policy 
journals, and books by foreign policy experts.  Throughout the research, two common themes of 
U.S. relations toward North Korea emerge, uncertainty and defiance.  North Korea’s secretive 
regime makes it difficult for U.S. presidential administrations to determine the intentions of 
North Korea’s actions.  Furthermore, the uncertainty often leads to defiant and aggressive actions 
by North Korea.  From the USS Pueblo crisis to the bombing of Yeonpyeong Island, presidential 
administrations had to walk a fine line of responding with aggression, negotiations, or 
appeasement.  The thesis examines not only the options and implementations of each presidential 
administration, but also looks toward possible solutions for maintaining peace and stability in 
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CHAPTER ONE – INTRODUCTION 
 
 The foreign policy of the United States toward North Korea originated shortly after the 
conclusion of World War II and escalated in significance during the subsequent Korean War.  
Since then, the entire history of U.S. foreign policy toward North Korea has been uncertain, with 
several provocations that almost led to another war.  As with foreign policy toward other 
countries, the presidential administrations have a guiding role in setting the direction of foreign 
policy.  Not every U.S. presidential administration played a major role in foreign policy toward 
North Korea because relations between the two countries faced a series of provocations, while at 
other times relations were relatively peaceful and nearly nonexistent.  The following thesis will 
focus on the key presidential administrations that dealt with U.S. foreign policy toward North 
Korea.   
Presidents Truman and Eisenhower set the foundation for U.S. foreign policy toward 
North Korea.  Both presidents were involved in the decision-making surrounding the Korean 
War and its consequences.  The current situation on the Korean peninsula traces its roots back to 
the end of the Korean War.  Following the Korean War, a period of relative peace emerged with 
very little to no contact between the U.S. and North Korea governments.   
The next major portion of foreign relations occurred after two major provocations by 
North Korea on the U.S. military in the region.  The USS Pueblo and EC-121 crises caused the 
Johnson and Nixon administrations to develop formal responses to the provocations.  The two 
administrations had a variety of options, but they realized the benefits must outweigh the risks 
associated with the chosen response.  No one knew for certain what North Korea was planning 
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after the Pueblo and EC-121 crises, but fortunately nothing major occurred between the two 
countries for quite some time.   
The next series of discussions between the U.S. and North Korea occurred during the 
Clinton administration.  While there were no provocations directly aimed at the United States, 
the discussions surrounded the issue of North Korea’s intent to build ballistic missiles and 
nuclear weapons.  The Clinton administration’s chief accomplishment was the Agreed 
Framework to ensure nuclear nonproliferation in North Korea.  The Bush administration 
continued the Agreed Framework with North Korea along with plans for verifying its nuclear 
weapons program, but there were few substantial results.  The Agreed Framework eventually fell 
apart following North Korea’s withdrawal from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty.  Once the 
Obama administration came into office, the level of provocations by North Korea increased to a 
point not seen since the Pueblo and EC-121 crises.  President Obama had to deal with ongoing 
nuclear tests, missile tests, the Cheonan sinking, and the Yeonpyeong Island shelling.  The 
Obama administration is interested in getting other countries, specifically China, involved in 
lowering the tensions on the Korean peninsula.   
Since the Truman administration, one common aspect of foreign relations with North 
Korea is the question of uncertainty.  It is difficult for even the brightest foreign policy experts to 
figure out what the secretive regime in North Korea is planning to do next.  From provocations 
like the capture of the Pueblo to the discussions about nuclear weapons, it is challenging to 
determine North Korea’s intentions and conduct negotiations with the regime.  For instance, the 
Agreed Framework looked like a promising nonproliferation agreement during the Clinton 
administration, but the question of nuclear weapons in North Korea was not solved completely 
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and remains a concern to this day.  Does North Korea have real intentions for its provocative acts 
and defiance, or does it just want concessions from the world community?  It is difficult to have 
a straightforward answer, but the history of U.S. foreign policy toward North Korea certainly 




CHAPTER TWO – THE KOREAN WAR ERA: PRESIDENT HARRY S. 
TRUMAN AND DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER 
 
 United States foreign policy toward North Korea dates back to the partition of the Korean 
peninsula in 1945.  At the Potsdam Conference, the United States agreed to administer control of 
Southern Korea while the Soviet Union agreed to control Northern Korea with the division line 
being the 38
th
 parallel.  Although the agreement did not state a specific timeline for the Korean 
partition, it was understood that the partition would be temporary while Korea rebuilt following 
the Japanese occupation during World War II (Hickey).  What no one knew at the time was the 
partition would remain for the foreseeable future.  The Soviets felt obligated to stay in Northern 
Korea and refuse any type of reunification of the Korean peninsula despite U.S. tries for a 
national election (Hickey).  The Soviets established a Communist government in North Korea 
with Kim Il-sung in charge.  Each side helped build up their respective parts of the Korean 
peninsula with Soviet and U.S. troops pulling out of Korea by 1948 (Hickey).  The withdrawal of 
troops would be short-lived as North Korea began its first major act of aggression, of which 
many more would follow, and sparked the Korean War.   
President Harry S. Truman 
Background 
 
President Harry S. Truman inherited the presidency following the death of Franklin D. 
Roosevelt.  Truman began his presidency with many foreign policy challenges including the end 
of World War II and the consequences of the war.  Truman fulfilled the remainder of Roosevelt’s 
term, ran for election in 1948, and won a close race against Thomas Dewey.  With the victory, 
Truman now had a mandate to develop his own foreign policy objectives.   
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In June of 1950, troops from the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) crossed 
the border and invaded South Korea.  U.S. policy prior to the invasion discounted the importance 
of defending the Southern half of the Korean peninsula from an invasion.  General MacAthur 
said, “[It was] not within the capabilities of the United States to establish Korean security forces 
capable of meeting full scale invasion” (Pearlman 57).  While members of Congress and the 
Defense Department echoed the same response as General MacArthur, the State Department 
realized the geopolitical necessity of South Korea toward the rebuilding of Asia, specifically 
Japan, after World War II.  South Korea could be a major, future market for Japanese goods, and 
unrest in South Korea could have negative impacts on the rebuilding of Japan (Kaufman 8).  The 
mixed opinions in the U.S. government made it unclear whether the United States would 
intervene militarily against the North Korean invasion.  With North Korean’s invasion of South 
Korea in 1950, it was imperative for the Truman administration to aid the South Koreans.  The 
first task the Truman administration accomplished was imposing a trade and financial relations 
embargo on North Korea called the Trading with the Enemy Act (Cha and Kang 91).  This was 
just a first step toward a U.S. military intervention against North Korea. 
The Soviet Influence on North Korea 
 
 The Soviet Union was one of the most influential countries on North Korea during the 
country’s formative years following World War II.  Soviet leader Joseph Stalin helped establish 
Kim Il-sung as the “Supreme Leader” of North Korea.  Kim Il-sung was a guiding force in the 
Workers’ Party of Korea, which was North Korea’s Communist Party at the time.  Due to the 
Soviet influence, the Kremlin originally did not want North Korea to conduct an invasion of the 
South because it saw an invasion as “inexpedient, irrational, untimely, and unwise” (Pearlman 
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58).  The Soviets were more focused on developing atomic weapons to increase deterrence 
against the United States rather than conducting an immediate, conventional invasion of South 
Korea.  Kim Il-sung tried to convince the Soviets that the United States, or even South Korea 
itself, was planning an imminent invasion of North Korea.  As a preemptive move to expand 
Communist influence, Kim Il-sung thought an invasion of South Korea was necessary (Pearlman 
59).   
The Decision to Defend South Korea 
 
 President Truman looked at the larger picture of international relations in making a 
decision to protect South Korea.  Some scholars question whether Truman’s goal in Korea was 
unification or status quo.  Robert Oliver thinks the U.S. wanted the status quo ante bellum, not a 
reunification on the Korean peninsula (Lee 101).  Truman knew the Soviets were looking to 
expand Communist influence throughout the world by commenting, “The Russians were trying 
to get Korea by default, gambling that we would be afraid of starting a third world war and 
would offer no resistance” (Lee 101).  The Korean peninsula appeared to be a logical place to 
expand since North Korea already had a Communist government.  Furthermore, with the Chinese 
Civil War in progress, the possibility of China being controlled by Communists was increasing.  
There would be political ramifications on the U.S. and its allies if the entire Korean peninsula 
fell to the Communists as well.  Truman felt he needed to do something to protect American 
prestige throughout the world.   
President Truman went to the United Nations (UN) to get approval for assisting South 
Korea.  The UN passed a resolution concerning military sanctions on North Korea, but it did not 
have an immediate consequence on halting actions against North Korea (Kaufman 8).  Truman 
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would later go back to the UN to get support for intervention against the North Korean army.  On 
a political front, building a global coalition through the UN would have greater political appeal 
rather than just a unilateral intervention.  Truman, like President George H. W. Bush in the First 
Gulf War, favored the political advantages of developing global coalitions for a single cause.  
However, global coalitions do have some drawbacks such as an oversized coalition could hamper 
the ultimate goal if the players involved share differing opinions on how to achieve the goal.  In 
the case of Korea, the global coalition was not oversized by any means; thus, eliminating the 
major drawback of a coalition.  The UN coalition was led primarily by South Korea, the United 
States, and the United Kingdom (including the Commonwealth countries of Canada, Australia, 
and New Zealand).   
 The United Nations convened a meeting of the Security Council on June 27, 1950, to 
discuss North Korea’s invasion of South Korea.  The Security Council passed Resolution 83 
acknowledging the North Korean aggression and calling for military assistance to South Korea 
(Hickey).  The Soviet Union, a permanent member of the Security Council, held a veto power 
against Security Council resolutions.  However, the Soviet Union was boycotting the Security 
Council meetings because of Taiwan’s status in the United Nations.  Despite the boycott, the 
Soviet Union still had the power to veto military assistance and walk out of the meeting 
immediately after voting.  The Soviet Union remained committed to the boycott and did not 
place a vote during the Security Council meeting concerning Korea.   
The Truman Administration’s Foreign Policy Objectives in Korea 
 
 The Truman administration practiced the policy of containment against Communist 
regimes such as North Korea.  However, containment itself was a passive concept aimed at 
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holding back the Communists until the regime collapsed internally.  President Truman took a 
maximalist view of containment that attempted to protect all areas of the world threatened by the 
spread of Communism.  General MacArthur wanted to take the concept of containment a further 
step by advocating rollback during the Korean War.  Rollback was aimed at causing the North 
Koreans to worry about defending land that was already under their control.  Thus, it implied that 
the 38
th
 parallel was not a real border and insisted on pushing U.S. and UN forces all the way to 
the Yalu River.  Interestingly, public opinion in the U.S. tended to favor military intervention 
into North Korea, as evidenced by the politically opposite magazines Life and the New Republic 
publishing articles in favor of a free Korea (Kaufman 9).   
 While the concept of rollback appealed to the Truman administration, crossing the 38
th
 
parallel and progressing deep into North Korea carried risks of Chinese or Soviet intervention.  
China had warned that it would intervene in the war if U.S. and UN forces were to cross the 38
th
 
parallel.  General MacArthur downplayed the Chinese threat and assured Truman at a meeting in 
Wake Island that the Chinese threat was minimal (Kaufman 10).  Thus, the approval was given 
to allow U.S. and UN forces march toward the Yalu River bordering China.   
 The U.S. and UN march into North Korea went smoothly, with little initial resistance.  
However, there were intelligence reports that Chinese troops were already in North Korea 
preparing for resistance.  By November, Chinese troops fought a short battle against the UN 
troops before retreating (Kaufman 11).  MacArthur once again discounted the battle’s 
significance and ordered his troops to march toward the Yalu.  A few days later, Chinese troops 
attacked the U.S. troops forcefully, causing the U.S. troops to retreat southward for safety.  It 
would prove to be a long, brutal retreat for the U.S. forces back to the 38
th
 parallel.   Following 
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the Chinese intervention, Truman wanted to tread cautiously by limiting the war to Korea despite 
opposition from MacArthur (Pearlman 169).    
The Political Results of Truman’s Objectives 
 
 The Truman administration proceeded toward its foreign policy objectives in Korea after 
the urging from General MacArthur that the invasion would proceed smoothly.  Nevertheless, 
the decision to proceed north of the 38
th
 parallel seemed ambitious, but it would turn into a major 
mistake on the part of MacArthur.  The brutal retreat had political ramifications on the Truman 
administration, and it widened the rift between MacArthur and Truman.  Politicians in 
Washington D.C. began to dislike the way things were going in Korea.  Some thought the war 
was too costly, but others like Republican Congressman Joseph William Martin, Jr. pushed for 
intensifying the conflict by claiming, “We must win” (Clayton 590).   
 Discussions within the White House and the U.S. military centered on the issue of 
MacArthur’s future.  Some officials within the Truman administration, especially Secretary of 
State Acheson, felt that MacArthur should be relieved of command (Clayton 591).  On the other 
hand, the Joint Chiefs of Staff were more cautious in their attitude toward removing MacArthur 
from command.  Paul Nitze proclaimed, “The President was reluctant to relieve General 
MacArthur…he leaned over backwards to see whether he couldn’t work things out” (Pearlman 
170).  Truman, nevertheless, issued the order to relieve MacArthur  as Supreme Allied 
Commander on April 10, 1951.   
 Truman was met with opposition for relieving MacArthur from command in Korea.  The 
Truman administration received many letters and telegrams calling for the reinstatement of 
MacArthur.  J.A. Sullivan, a general merchant, wrote a letter to Truman stating: 
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You [Truman] have made a grave mistake.  The General is bigger than he was; 
you are smaller, much smaller.  You are dead politically. MacArthur is a hero!  
We needed MacArthur; he did not need us...  YOU WILL REGRET IT!  I think 
Dean Acheson is persona non grata to the American public, as a whole; and he 
should RESIGN or be REPLACED by another… (Sullivan) 
The political sentiment turned against Truman, despite MacArthur’s embarrassing retreat 
from the Yalu River following the Chinese intervention in North Korea.   Despite the public 
outcry, Truman wanted to maintain his policy of limited war in Korea since MacArthur was no 
longer an obstacle.  Truman’s term was ending shortly, and the situation in Korea was changed 
with the removal of MacArthur.  Truman did not have enough time to commit the country to his 
policy of limited war and ultimately ending the war in Korea.  That job would be left to the next 
president, Dwight D. Eisenhower. 
President Dwight D. Eisenhower 
 
 The popular World War II general was sworn in as President of the United States on 
January 20, 1953, and was now responsible for the country’s foreign policy.  One of his main 
campaign promises and foreign policy goals was an end to the war on the Korean peninsula.  
During an October 24, 1952, campaign speech, Eisenhower stated, “That job requires a personal 
trip to Korea.  I shall make that trip.  I shall go to Korea” (“Presidential candidate”).  How 
exactly would President Eisenhower accomplish an end to the Korean War?  The Eisenhower 
administration, especially Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, continued to advocate the 
strategy of rollback in Korea.  However, the Eisenhower administration also developed a New 
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Look strategy comprising the doctrine of massive retaliation, which included the possible use of 
nuclear weapons. 
 President-elect Eisenhower, fulfilling his campaign promise, visited South Korea in 
December 1952 for three days talking to generals and examining the battlefront from the air 
(Hickey).  Eisenhower appeared committed to ending the war in Korea, but how exactly would 
he accomplish this?  Being a general, would he opt for a military option?  Alternatively, would 
he go immediately to the peace table for diplomatic talks?   
Military Options and the Question of Nuclear Weapons 
 
Just because Eisenhower had the intention of peace in Korea does not mean he 
discounted military options to achieve his goal.  Eisenhower, being a prominent general, had his 
administration review military options for ending the war in Korea.  Secretary of Defense 
Charles Wilson planned a military advance into North Korea, with possible air support and the 
use of tactical nuclear weapons (Steuck 310).  The success of another attack was not too 
optimistic, but there was hope that a strong attack would force North Korea to give concessions 
at the peace talks.  In March 1953, the Joint Chiefs of Staff met and questioned the use of tactical 
nuclear weapons in ending the war (Steuck 310).  The National Security Council held a meeting 
on May 20, 1953, discussing the use of nuclear weapons to hasten the signing of the armistice 
(Jackson 55).  The meeting made no significant decisions regarding the use of nuclear weapons.  
The National Security Council Planning Board released a report in April 1953 stating the 
strength of Chinese and Communist forces in Korea was too high for any U.S. military success 
(Steuck 310).  The Eisenhower administration, while keeping the military options open, wanted 
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to avoid another setback like the Truman administration encountered following MacArthur’s 
march to the Yalu River and subsequent retreat. 
 Scholars frequently study the option of using nuclear weapons against North Korea citing 
the Eisenhower administration’s strategy of massive retaliation.  The debate about using nuclear 
weapons against North Korea continued even after the armistice was signed because of the 
possibility of another invasion.  Eisenhower said, “We should use the bomb in Korea if 
aggression is renewed” (Jackson 57).  Eisenhower was so committed to the use of nuclear 
weapons that he tried to convince British Prime Minister Winston Churchill about the 
effectiveness of nuclear weapons against North Korea (Jackson 62).   
 A common issue discussed surrounding the use of nuclear weapons was the role of China 
in North Korean affairs.  As indicated during the Truman administration, the Chinese provided 
North Korea military support to push the Americans toward the southern part of the Korean 
peninsula.  If China played a vital role in North Korean affairs, would China be a valid target for 
nuclear weapons in case of an armistice breach?  The Joint Chiefs of Staff and State Department 
declared in a memorandum the importance of prohibiting the Chinese Communists from 
assisting North Korea even if it means using nuclear weapons (Jackson 60).  The Eisenhower 
administration emphasized the role of the Communists as the primary cause of trouble in Korea.  
Despite the rhetoric, the plans of bombing China were limited to only targets that were known to 
support North Korea (Jackson 59).  There was no intention to overthrow the Chinese government 





 Despite the military options, the Eisenhower administration saw no single military 
solution for ending the war quickly and successfully.  The Eisenhower administration started 
making efforts to sign an armistice ending the conflict on the Korean peninsula.  A key factor in 
the peace talks was the death of Soviet leader Joseph Stalin.  The Soviet Union was now more 
willing to end the conflict on the Korean peninsula (“The Korean War”).  U.S. public opinion in 
the months leading up to the armistice was divided, but 69% of Americans polled favored 
signing an armistice along the current lines, according to an official memorandum within the 
Eisenhower administration (“Public Opinion”).  Within the same poll, 70% of Americans had 
confidence in Eisenhower’s handling of the Korean War (“Public Opinion”).   
The final armistice agreement was signed on July 26, 1953 with the following three main 
provisions: (1) halt of hostilities; (2) creation of a demilitarized zone; (3) transfer of prisoners of 
war (“The Korean War”).  Eisenhower made a speech the same evening saying, “Tonight we 
greet, with prayers of thanksgiving, the official news that an armistice was signed almost an hour 
ago in Korea. It will quickly bring to an end the fighting between the United Nations forces and 
the Communist armies” (Wooley “Radio”).   
Other Diplomatic Talks with North Korea 
 
 In addition to the armistice, the United States and North Korea agreed to hold diplomatic 
meetings in Panmunjom in October 1953 to discuss the issue of foreign military forces on the 
Korean peninsula (Lee 102).  North Korea wanted the removal of all foreign forces on the 
Korean peninsula, but the United States was uncertain about the potential for a future North 
Korean invasion of South Korea.  Overall, the Panmunjom meeting ended in December 1953 
without any substantial results, but it was a step at diplomatic negotiations between the U.S. and 
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North Korea (Lee 102).  The border village of Panmunjom would be the only location for 
communication between the U.S. and North Korea into the future (Lee 103).    
 In another effort to solve the questions surrounding the Korean peninsula, a diplomatic 
meeting was held in Geneva on April 26, 1954, consisting of foreign ministers of China, South 
Korea, North Korea, the Soviet Union, and sixteen UN countries (Lee 102).  The Geneva 
Conference tried to resolve the issues of foreign troops on Korean soil, but the conference turned 
into a rivalry between the two main camps, the Communists and the Western countries.  The 
Soviet Union, China, and North Korea expressed discontent with the UN intervention in Korea 
and called for the removal of all foreign troops in Korea (Lee 102).  The conference also brought 
up the issue of having a Korea-wide election supervised by neutral countries to determine the 
future of a united Korea.  The United States, along with its allies, felt that the Communists could 
not provide a fair and free election in Korea.  Thus, the “Sixteen-Nation Declaration” was issued 
which denounced the Communists for its negative outlook concerning the UN intervention in 
Korea (Lee 103).  Like the Panmunjom meeting, the Geneva Conference failed to produce 
concrete results due to the widening rift between the Communists and Western countries. 
The Truman and Eisenhower Administration Conclusion 
 
 Both the Truman and Eisenhower administrations dealt with the North Korean invasion 
of South Korea and its consequences.  The Truman administration had the responsibility to 
decide whether U.S. intervention was necessary in Korea.  With UN support, Truman led the U.S. 
on a military intervention aimed at protecting South Korea from Communism.  A major obstacle 
was the conflicting goals of President Truman and General MacArthur in Korea.  Ultimately, 
Truman relieved MacArthur as Supreme Commander of Allied Forces, but at the same time, it 
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increased political opposition within the United States.  Truman left office with the ongoing 
Korean War and no particular end in sight.   
 Meanwhile, the Eisenhower administration came into office with the goal of ending the 
Korean conflict and ensuring the safety of South Korea against possible future invasions.  
Eisenhower, even before assuming office, visited South Korea to assess the situation.  He was 
left with a variety of choices regarding North Korea, such as whether to use nuclear weapons or 
draw the line to end the fighting.  The subsequent peace talks resulted in the signing of an 
armistice agreement ending the fighting on the Korean peninsula.  The results of the Korean War 
included a widened separation between the Communists and the Western countries along with a 
continued division of Korea around the 38
th
 parallel.  The division of the Korean peninsula 





CHAPTER THREE – THE VIETNAM ERA: PRESIDENT LYNDON B. 
JOHNSON AND RICHARD NIXON 
 
 Relations between the United States and North Korea were scarce in the years after the 
end of the Korean War.  There were only a few small incidents including the shoot down of a 
U.S. military helicopter in North Korea in 1964 and the attempted assassination of South Korean 
President Park Chung-hee in 1968 (Lee 105).  As the U.S. became involved in the Vietnam War, 
it was natural for U.S. foreign policy to gravitate toward the war effort in Southeast Asia.  
However, acts of aggression by North Korea including the capture of the USS Pueblo and the 
shoot down of the EC-121 intelligence aircraft would cause both the Johnson administration and 
the Nixon administration to devote time for decision-making regarding North Korea.   




The Johnson administration focused on domestic policy such as the Great Society, but the 
situation in Vietnam forced the administration to increase emphasis on foreign policy.  
Meanwhile, relations between the United States and North Korea diminished when North Korean 
commandoes tried to assassinate South Korean President Park Chung-hee at the Blue House on 
January 21, 1968 (Lee 106).  The assassination attempt was unsuccessful, but it enhanced U.S. 
awareness of North Korea’s potential for creating further hostility in the future.  Only two days 
later on January 23, 1968, North Korea captured the USS Pueblo, a lightly armed U.S. naval 
reconnaissance ship.  The ship was conducting surveillance of Soviet ships and listening to radio 
signals off the coast of North Korea (Haggard 7).  A key fault in this mission was the lack of 
preparation for defending the ship against hostile actions.  Following an attack on the USS 
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Liberty, the U.S. federal government had plans to upgrade the Pueblo with more powerful 
armament for defense against attacks.  Yet, the budget for these armament upgrades was cut to a 
minimum, and the Pueblo was deemed worthy to sail with two .50 caliber machine guns 
(Haggard 8).  The ship was ordered to get no closer than 13 miles to the North Korean mainland 
since North Korea claimed up to 12 miles out to sea (Haggard 8).  
 As the Pueblo was quietly off the coast of North Korea listening for radio signals and 
collecting samples, two North Korean fishing boats spotted the ship and reported it to North 
Korea’s government.  The activity grew as North Korea sent torpedo boats and MiG fighter jets 
to the scene.  The North Korean ships ordered the Pueblo to leave the area, but Captain Bucher 
of the Pueblo claimed the ship was about 15 miles offshore, which were international waters 
(Haggard 11).  Why did the captain not defend his ship from this antagonistic confrontation?  He 
claimed the two machine guns were frozen and vulnerable to hostile fire (Haggard 12).  Since the 
Pueblo was overwhelmed by North Korea fire, the captain decided to destroy all classified 
information and equipment before surrendering to the North Koreans.  By the time the ship 
surrendered and was taken to Wonsan Port, not all of the classified information was destroyed 
(Haggard 13).   
At the time of the ship’s capture, the captain claimed the Pueblo was at least 15 miles off 
shore, which was well above the 12-mile zone claimed by North Korea (Koh 273).  The North 
Koreans took the ship’s 83 crewmembers captive and published propaganda claiming that an 
American ship was caught spying in North Korean territorial waters (Koh 273).  North Korea 
was able to obtain a written confession from Captain Bucher that the Pueblo ventured into North 
Korean waters, but there is suspicion of fabrication due to the confession’s poor English 
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grammar (Koh 273).  The North Koreans treated the captured American sailors harshly, and the 
crewmembers claimed they were tortured for an admission of guilt (Koh 274). 
The Question of an Immediate Response 
 
The Johnson administration, whose hands were full in Vietnam, tried to develop a 
response aimed at obtaining the release of the ship and its sailors.  An immediate, military 
response relied on U.S. military forces in the region to provide aerial support for the Pueblo.  
However, U.S. military aircraft were not ready to provide immediate support due to distance, 
equipment, and planning constraints (Mobley 43).  The distance constraints involved U.S. fighter 
jets based in nearby Japan.  It would have taken too much time to prepare the aircraft for the 
journey to North Korea.  Furthermore, there were questions surrounding an agreement with 
Japan that prevented U.S. fighters from flying into a combat mission directly (Mobley 44).  This 
meant the fighters would have to stop in South Korea first before continuing to North Korea.  
The U.S. had fighters stationed in South Korea, but all were equipped with nuclear weapons 
which required removal and replacement with conventional weapons (Mobley 43).  Finally, the 
U.S. was just not ready to provide a quick military response to the Pueblo due to poor 
contingency planning.  The key in a rescue of the Pueblo was a prompt response before the ship 
got into a North Korean port.  Once the Pueblo docked at Wonsan port, it would be difficult for 
the U.S. to provide military support because of North Korean anti-aircraft defenses and seventy-
five MiGs stationed near the port of Wonsan (Mobley 45).  Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
General Wheeler, based on the situation in North Korea, told President Johnson that it was too 





Back in Washington D.C., the State Department put together a Korea Working Group to 
develop options along with the positive and negative aspects of each option.  The group 
developed ten well-reasoned options for the Johnson administration to consider.  Among the top 
options was a surgical airstrike of North Korean air and naval bases responsible for the capture 
of the Pueblo (Mobley 59).  The surgical bombing option was the most aggressive of the options 
discussed at the Korea Working Group.  Another option discussed was a blockade or mining of 
Wonsan harbor, both of which were less aggressive actions than a surgical airstrike.  The less 
aggressive options included pursuing high-altitude reconnaissance missions over North Korea 
and the possibility of establishing trade embargos on the country (Mobley 62).   
Former President Eisenhower, who played an instrumental role in U.S. foreign policy 
toward North Korea, urged the Johnson administration to consider using nuclear weapons as 
retaliation (Jackson 56).   Eisenhower was known for keeping nuclear weapons on the table in 
case of a future invasion or attack by North Korea, known as massive retaliation.  It is unclear 
how much thought Johnson put into the possibility of using nuclear weapons, but he did not 
consider it as one of his main options for ending the Pueblo crisis.  The use of nuclear weapons 
simply carried too much risk of escalating the issue into a full-scale war.   
President Johnson reviewed the various options and decided to stay away from the 
militarily hostile options, opting for additional negotiations with North Korea.  In February 1968, 
American and North Korean officials started secret talks in Panmunjom about the Pueblo crisis 
(Lee 107).  No immediate results of the talks occurred, but the South Koreans felt betrayed that 
the U.S. was talking in secret with the Communist government (Lee 107).   
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Throughout the ordeal, the United States refused to admit the Pueblo ventured into North 
Korean territorial waters.  Johnson deployed the aircraft carrier USS Enterprise off the coast of 
South Korea in a show of force (Koh 274).  Koh argues that Johnson practiced much restraint 
and never intended to use force against North Korea (274).  The United States negotiated with 
North Korea to obtain the release of the prisoners and the ship, with priority placed on the 
prisoners.  Overall, there were 28 meetings between American and North Korean officials about 
the incident (Lee 107).  After ten months of negotiations, North Korea released all surviving 
crewmembers after an apology stating the ship wandered into North Korean waters.  The U.S. 
officially withdrew the statement, but North Korean claimed a diplomatic victory over the United 
States (Lee 108).   
Opinions of the Johnson Administration 
 
George C. Herring praises Johnson for his restraint in handling the Pueblo crisis (752).  
While it is true that Johnson kept his restraint from using military force against North Korea, the 
initial negotiations with North Korea produced very few tangible results in terms of gaining the 
swift release of the crew and ship.  Graham Allison disagrees with Herring by pointing out that 
Johnson lacked a means of response and chose not to do anything significant (30).  Allison does 
not see any particular success in the Johnson administration other than the eventual release of the 
captured American sailors nearly a year later, but North Korea’s refusal to release the actual ship 
is somewhat embarrassing to the United States.  The Pueblo itself may not have been the most 
important ship in the U.S. Navy, but the fact that a commissioned naval ship remains in the 
hands of North Korea as a propaganda display for tourists is awkward.  Presidential 
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administrations since Johnson have attempted to negotiate with North Korea about the Pueblo’s 
release, but none of the attempts were successful.   




President Nixon, like Johnson, also faced foreign policy challenges because of North 
Korea’s hostile actions.  Nixon, a prominent realist president, focused more on tackling foreign 
policy issues compared to the Johnson administration that focused on domestic policy like the 
Great Society.  Nixon was poised to bring about an end to the Vietnam War through concepts 
such as détente and linkage.  Nixon also came into office with a view of reducing the role of the 
U.S. military throughout Asia, which was called the Guam Doctrine (Lee 109).  In August 1969, 
Nixon met with South Korean President Park Chung-hee about South Korea’s need to rely on its 
own military forces, but Nixon also emphasized U.S. backing if North Korea were to attack 
South Korea according to the Mutual Defense Treaty of 1954 (Lee 85).  Nixon planned to 
withdraw 24,000 U.S. military personnel from Korea by 1973 and offer help to build up South 
Korea’s forces (Lee 85).   
In the meantime, talks about reunification on the Korean peninsula were well underway.  
Nixon made his historic visit to China in 1972 to help improve relations, but North Korea viewed 
the visit with uncertainty about Korea’s future (Lee 85).  North Korea knew the United States 
had troops stationed in South Korea and did not like the idea of unification with the presence of 
U.S. troops.  The reunification talks stalled and both sides remained uncertain about the other’s 
motive.      
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On April 15, 1969, North Korean MiG fighter jets shot down a U.S. Navy Lockheed EC-
121 electronic surveillance aircraft killing all airmen on board the aircraft.  Similar to the Pueblo, 
the EC-121 was on a routine mission gathering intelligence close to the North Korean coastline.  
Unlike the Pueblo incident, there was no need for negotiating with North Korea about the return 
of American personnel or equipment since everything was destroyed.  However, the act’s 
provocativeness could lead to an increased possibility of military retaliation by U.S. forces.  It is 
difficult to determine the exact reason why North Korea shot down the EC-121, but the country 
did not back down on its steadfast position that the EC-121 flew into North Korean airspace.  
The aircraft’s orders were to stay about fifty miles offshore, and the U.S. claimed the aircraft was 
at least ninety nautical miles off the coast of North Korea when it was shot down (Lee 108).   
The Nixon Administration’s Options 
 
President Nixon first heard news of the crash on April 15, and he realized the missteps 
that the Johnson administration made during the Pueblo crisis.  Nixon had two major options for 
dealing with the EC-121 incident.  The first option was an immediate military retaliation, as 
indicated by officials of the United States Pacific Command (Mobley 120).  However, the 
military forces in the region necessary for retaliation were not ready for immediate deployment.  
The USS Enterprise, a prominent carrier group, was busy with the enhanced bombing in 
Vietnam.  It would have taken time to gather the forces to retaliate against North Korea.   
Unlike Johnson, Nixon did not like to assemble his advisors into the so-called “Situation 
Room” for a meeting about the EC-121 (Mobley 121).  Nevertheless, the National Security 
Council met on April 16 to discuss options, which mostly involved military force, for responding 
to the situation.  Nixon’s advisers realized that if a military response was taken, North Korea’s 
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air defenses were a major obstacle to conducting a successful operation.  The Joint Chiefs of 
Staff developed a plan called FRESH STORM aimed at taking out North Korea’s air defenses in 
anticipation for a U.S. military strike (Wampler).  Nixon’s Cabinet members differed in opinions 
about the ideal options for responding to the situation in North Korea.  While most of Nixon’s 
Cabinet members favored some sort of military retaliation, Secretary of Defense Laird and 
Secretary of State Rogers objected to retaliation citing the possibility of sparking two wars in 
Asia (Mobley 123).  Indeed, Nixon realized the possibility of escalation resulting from a military 
retaliation.   
Nixon and National Security Adviser Henry Kissinger met several times to discuss 
options.  According to recently declassified documents, Nixon seriously discussed the option of 
nuclear retaliation with his advisors.  One option, called FREEDOM DROP, was a tactical 
nuclear strike on key North Korean targets with few estimated casualties (Wampler).  The other 
nuclear option was more large scale with plans to destroy most of North Korea’s military forces 
(Wampler).  Nixon also met with Secretary of State William Rodgers who favored a restrained 
approach.  Rodgers stated, “The weak can be rash; the powerful must be more restrained” (Lee 
109).  In all of the options, the Nixon administration was uncertain about North Korea’s response 
to a military strike.   
The Nixon Administration’s Response 
 
 Nixon decided to avoid the consequences of using military options and relied on 
diplomatic options instead.  At a press conference, Nixon proclaimed his restraint against using 
military force, but calling the attack “unprovoked” (Lee 109).  Nixon called for the resumption 
of reconnaissance flights in the region with naval backup provided by Task Force 71 (Lee 109).  
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In line with Nixon’s Guam Doctrine of reducing the role of the U.S. military in Asia, the number 
of U.S. troops in South Korea was decreased along with the eventual removal of Task Force 71.  
Instead of direct U.S. support, Nixon wanted the allies in the region to carry a heavier burden for 
their own protection (Lee 110).  Furthermore, Nixon urged the peaceful coexistence of the 
Communists and the Western world despite their differing views on issues, which was a main 
reason for his trip to China (Lee 109).   
The Johnson and Nixon Administration Conclusion 
 
 The Johnson administration was caught off guard during the Vietnam War with the 
sudden capture of the USS Pueblo off the coast of North Korea.  The administration took time to 
develop a response aimed at obtaining the release of the crewmembers and the ship.  After ten 
months of negotiations, North Korea released the Pueblo’s crew but kept the ship as a museum 
to show foreign visitors.  Following the release of the American sailors ten months after the 
capture, Johnson called for the strengthening of U.S. military forces in South Korea to provide 
deterrence against a North Korean invasion.    
The Nixon administration, known for its hard-line stance, approached the EC-121 
incident with caution much like the Johnson administration.  The Nixon administration, however, 
seriously discussed military options of retaliation against North Korea, but opted for restraint.  
Indeed, this concept of restraint is a key obstacle that future presidential administrations will face 
regarding foreign policy toward North Korea.  Is the option of conducting an immediate, military 
retaliation worth the risk of restarting a large-scale war on the Korean peninsula?  Both the 
Johnson and Nixon administration felt that the risk of war was too high for conducting a military 
retaliation; thus, both opted for peaceful responses.  
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CHAPTER FOUR – NEW CHALLENGES FOR PRESIDENT BILL 
CLINTON 
 
 Much like Lyndon Johnson, President Bill Clinton came into office with ambitious 
domestic policy goals, but he initially spent little of his time contemplating foreign policy issues 
except for NAFTA; however, his foreign policy worldview evolved over his first term as he 
began to pay more attention to traditional security issues (Jewett and Turetzky).  A highlight of 
the Clinton administration’s foreign policy was Somalia, but otherwise there was a lack of 
consistency, according to Ryan Barilleaux (29).  The subject of North Korea was pretty far down 
the initial list of important foreign policy issues for the newly formed Clinton administration.  
However, North Korea would garner the attention of the Clinton administration through its own 
actions, or in some cases, a lack of action involving international inspections of nuclear facilities.  
Richard Melanson argues that the Clinton administration worried the most about North Korea 
compared to other countries because of the threat of nuclear weapons (265).   
Background 
 
 Clinton preferred using multilateral diplomacy by interacting with regional powers and 
international institutions (Melanson 264).  In North Korea’s case, regional countries like China 
and Russia have a certain amount of influence on North Korea since the Korean War.  China, for 
instance, provides North Korea with 90 percent of its energy, 80 percent of trade goods, and 45 
percent of its food (Bajoria).  North Korea clearly relies on China for the survival of the country, 
and Chinese influence on North Korea has the possibility of being an effective method for 
conducting foreign relations.  Joel Wit uses the metaphor of “lips and teeth” to describe the 
closeness of China and North Korea (21).  William Triplett refers to the China and North Korea 
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relationship as an opportunity for “borrowed knife” linkage (12).  China realizes it needs to 
balance its relationship with North Korea and may not be willing to increase punitive actions on 
North Korea.  Russia, to some extent, also has influence on North Korea because of its former 
Communist partnership.  While other regional countries like Japan and South Korea lack direct 
influence, the subject of North Korea is an important aspect of Japan and South Korea’s 
respective foreign policies.  Multilateral diplomacy also has the positive aspect of gaining 
international legitimacy for decisions and subsequent actions.  Clinton realized the importance of 
getting the other regional players involved in negotiations, but it could come at a cost of having 
too many players at the negotiating table.  Having too many players increases the difficulty of 
reaching an agreement because all of the involved parties have their own national interests.   
Major Points of the Clinton Administration’s Foreign Policy 
 
 The Clinton administration’s foreign policy toward North Korea centered on several main 
issues including the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, the Agreed Framework, and the terrorism 
list.  The issue of nuclear weapons was a major source of worry for the Clinton administration at 
the time.  The unpredictability of North Korea’s actions in the past, like the USS Pueblo and EC-
121 crises, added to the level of uncertainty the Clinton administration had about North Korea.  
Despite a focus on domestic policy, the administration spent time considering North Korea’s 
development of nuclear weapons.   
The Question of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty 
 
 Prior to the Clinton presidency, North Korea had signed the Nuclear Nonproliferation 
Treaty (NPT) in 1985, but the country showed few signs of following the treaty’s provisions.  
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North Korea repeatedly refused to give the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) 
permission to inspect suspected nuclear sites inside the country.  The country continued its 
development of nuclear weapons despite international disapproval.  For instance, the 
international community widely knew about North Korea possessing a nuclear reactor at 
Yongbyon, but the primary cause for concern was the development of a reprocessing facility for 
sourcing plutonium to manufacture nuclear weapons, which was a violation of the NPT 
(Henriksen 30).  North Korea planned to withdraw itself from the NPT in March 1993, but the 
Clinton administration felt this would have been a bad move because it could lead to a nuclear 
arms race in South Korea and Japan for defensive purposes (Barilleaux).  Negotiations among 
the United States, South Korea, Japan, and North Korea commenced with a goal of preventing 
North Korea’s withdrawal from the NPT.  North Korea ultimately agreed to remain a signer of 
the NPT and allow international inspectors into the country (Henriksen 30).  In return for the 
agreement, the Clinton administration lessened economic sanctions against North Korea hoping 
to improve relations between the countries (Henriksen 31).  North Korea, nevertheless, remained 
defiant against international inspection of nuclear facilities within the country.   
 These factors triggered the Clinton administration to evaluate its options once again for 
dealing with a nuclear threat from North Korea.  On NBC’s “Meet the Press,” Clinton made a 
seemingly aggressive statement, “North Korea cannot be allowed to develop a nuclear bomb” 
(Henriksen 31).  Secretary of Defense Les Aspin made a statement afterwards that toned down 
the reaction against North Korea, saying North Korea could not become a “nuclear power” 
(Henriksen 31).  These two statements show the differing views within the Clinton 
administration about the question of North Korea possessing nuclear weapons.  The first 
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statement implied a staunch refusal to allow North Korea to possess any nuclear weapons, while 
the second statement implied it was acceptable for North Korea to possess nuclear weapons as 
long as the country did not become a nuclear power like the United States or Russia.  These 
differing opinions raise questions about the degree to which North Korea should be allowed to 
develop nuclear weapons, if any.   
The Agreed Framework 
 
In the light of North Korean defiance, the Clinton administration continued negotiations 
with North Korea about its nuclear program.  The next major event was the Agreed Framework 
in October 1994 that included several provisions aimed at solving the nuclear problem.  During a 
visit to North Korea in June 1994, former President Jimmy Carter played an unofficial role in the 
development of the Agreed Framework.  Carter openly criticized the sanctions placed on North 
Korea, and the Clinton administration was forced to accept Carter’s deal with North Korea 
(Bluth).   
The Agreed Framework’s goal was a nuclear freeze within North Korea, specifically 
calling for the closure of the Yongbyon reactor.  In return for the nuclear freeze, the agreement 
allowed for the construction of two light water reactors in North Korea for power generation 
purposes only.  The light water reactors are harder for nuclear proliferation compared to North 
Korea’s existing graphite reactors (Henricksen 31).  The Agreement Framework helped reaffirm 
North Korea’s commitment to the NPT.  Clinton made a statement on October 18, 1994, saying, 
“I am pleased that the United States and North Korea yesterday reached agreement on the text of 
a framework document on North Korea's nuclear program.  This agreement will help to achieve a 
longstanding and vital American objective: “an end to the threat of nuclear proliferation on the 
 29 
 
Korean Peninsula” (Woohley “Remarks on Nuclear”).  The Clinton administration believed the 
Agreed Framework would end the nuclear problem in North Korea.   
The Agreed Framework gained opposition from the newly elected Republican Congress 
because of its lack of verification and the provision allowing the transfer of nuclear technology 
to North Korea for power purposes (Henriksen 37).  Due to the lack of verification, it would be 
difficult for the U.S. to ensure compliance of the agreement in the future.  Furthermore, the 
agreement included a provision for a foreign country to construct two light-water reactors in 
North Korea for power usage purposes, which many members of Congress opposed.  The light-
water reactors have a lower likelihood of nuclear weapons usage, compared to North Korea’s 
existing Yongbyon nuclear reactor (Melanson 266).     
Sin Yong Song, North Korea’s Vice Minister of Power and Coal Industries, called the 
Agreed Framework’s plan to construct two light water reactions a “scheme” by the United States 
(Yong).  He thought the U.S. made this agreement because of anticipation of an early North 
Korean collapse following Kim Il-sung’s death (Yong).  The so-called “scheme” was just typical 
rhetoric by the North Korean officials to draw criticism of the United States at any given 
opportunity.  As it turned out, Kim Jong-il, Kim Il-sung’s son, succeeded him smoothly and 
successfully without an early collapse of North Korea.   
Removal from Terrorism List? 
 
 Shortly before Clinton left office, his administration considered the removal of North 
Korea from the U.S. terrorism list.  In February 2000, Clinton submitted the following four 
requirements to North Korea before the U.S. would remove it from the terrorism list: (1) issue a 
written guarantee that it is no longer involved in terrorism; (2) provide evidence that it has not 
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conducted a terrorist act in the last six months; (3) join the international anti-terrorism 
agreements; (4) address issues of past terrorism support (Manyin 7).  Both South Korea and 
Japan had differing opinions about North Korea’s removal from the terrorism list.  South Korea’s 
President Kim Dae-jong agreed that North Korea should be removed from the terrorism list 
because it no longer posed a terrorist threat (Manyin 7).  Japan, however, raised concerns about 
the issue of North Korea abducting Japanese citizens as a terrorism act (Manyin 7).  In addition, 
North Korea’s firing of a ballistic missile over Japan in 1998 may have caused concern about the 
removal from the terrorism list.   
Secretary of State Madeline Albright made a historic visit to North Korea in late 2000 to 
discuss various issues including the kidnapping of Japanese citizens and North Korea’s ballistic 
missile program.  During the meeting, North Korea downplayed the Japanese abductee issue and 
turned down the Clinton administration’s four requirements for removal from the terrorism list 
(Manyin 9).  Ultimately, the Clinton administration left the discussions empty handed and did 
not remove North Korea from the terrorism list. 
Opinions of the Clinton Administration 
 
 Joel Wit examines the effects of the Clinton administration’s policy toward North Korea. 
Wit acknowledges the importance of Clinton’s multilateral approach to diplomacy, but he also 
cautions a complete focus on multilateralism (Wit).  However, there are also obstacles in 
multilateral diplomacy with North Korea due to the differing views of the key players.  It is often 
challenging to develop an agreement that satisfies all sides of the negotiating table.  For instance, 
giving concessions, such as economic aid, to North Korea has the possibility of upsetting South 
Korea, which may take a tougher stance by objecting to any concessions.  China, on the other 
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hand, may be unwilling to draw a tougher stance on North Korea compared to the United States, 
Japan, or South Korea.  China’s national interests in North Korea have the potential to hinder or 
benefit any type of negotiations.   
 The concept of concessions was a key issue of debate within not only the Clinton 
administration, but also other presidential administrations.  For instance, the U.S. pledged 
500,000 tons of food aid in 1999 to help alleviate North Korea’s famine (Melanson 266).  In 
return, North Korea agreed to allow U.S. officials to inspect a nuclear facility within the country.  
Once the U.S. inspectors visited the facility, North Korea had already removed the questionable 
nuclear material as witnessed by intelligence reports of activity prior to the visit (Melanson 266).  
North Korea successfully obtained the food aid while preventing the discovery of suspected 
nuclear material.  Is North Korea using its nuclear weapons program to gain concessions from 
the international community?  It is arguable that North Korea is taking advantage of aid without 
giving concrete results to its promises.  Hostile actions of North Korea often lead to a trend of 
concessions and broken promises.   
The Clinton Administration Conclusion 
 
The Clinton administration started with little interest about North Korean affairs.  
However, with increasing signs of nuclear weapons development, the administration turned its 
attention to decision-making surrounding North Korea’s nuclear program.  The administration 
made several efforts to stop nuclear development, including the Agreed Framework, but none of 
which made substantial, long-term improvement in the U.S. relationship with North Korea.  Kim 
Il-sung and Kim Jong-il were able to leverage their advantages in discussions with the United 
States by obtaining foreign aid.  Despite North Korea’s commitment to the NPT and the 1994 
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Agreed Framework, North Korea would withdraw from the NPT in 2003 causing the Agreed 
Framework to crumble.  North Korea continues with the development of nuclear weapons and 
ballistic missiles despite the administration’s attempts at negotiating a means of verification.  
Hence, Clinton’s Secretary of Defense William Perry called North Korea “the greatest security 




CHAPTER FIVE – CONTINUING CHALLENGES FOR PRESIDENT 
GEORGE W. BUSH 
 
 As President George W. Bush took office, he faced the continuing challenges regarding 
North Korea’s nuclear weapon and ballistic missile programs.  The Bush administration initially 
did not have large foreign policy ambitions, according to Georgetown University Professor 
Andrew Bennett, who thought Bush would be a minimalist and unilateralist in foreign affairs 
(Hiebert).  The Bush administration realized the shortcomings of the Agreed Framework and felt 
a need to change the direction of foreign policy toward North Korea.  Bush set a major part of his 
foreign policy during the 2001 State of the Union Address in which he listed North Korea as a 
part of the “axis of evil.”  North Korea was already on the list of terrorist supporters prior to the 
Bush administration, but the “axis of evil” reinforced the idea of North Korea being a rogue state.  
The administration appeared to be on a more aggressive stance against North Korea compared to 
prior administrations.  Despite the “axis of evil” remark, Bush made it clear at a 2002 news 
conference that the “We [United States] have no intention of invading North Korea” (Bumiller).   
Background 
 
The Bush administration was divided in terms of foreign policy perspective.  Michael 
Mazarr writes in Foreign Affairs that the Bush administration contained two distinctive camps of 
followers: the hawks and the pragmatists (Mazarr).  Mazarr considers the hawkish members of 
the administration to be Undersecretary of State John Bolton, Vice President Dick Cheney, and 
Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, while the moderate, pragmatist member was Secretary 
of State Colin Powell (Mazarr).  Powell wanted the Bush administration to continue negotiations 
with North Korea regarding the Agreed Framework begun under the Clinton administration.  
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Overseas, South Korean President Kim Dae Jung sided with Powell by urging the administration 
to continue with Clinton’s policies surrounding the Agreed Framework (Mazarr).  Indeed, 
President Bush had to deal with conflicting views within his administration and internationally 
about the best policy toward North Korea. 
The Bush administration arguably leaned toward the hawkish viewpoint during the first 
term in office.  While the Bush administration distrusted North Korea’s defiance against the U.S. 
throughout his entire term, the administration shifted views in the second term to allow for 
diplomatic flexibility called tailored containment (Kwak and Jooo 145).  This tailored 
containment policy allowed for several meetings of the Six Party Talks regarding North Korea’s 
nuclear program in 2007-2008. 
Major Points of the Bush Administration’s Foreign Policy 
 
 Like other presidential administrations, the Bush administration had to tailor its foreign 
policy goals based on the situation in North Korea.  The growing questions regarding North 
Korea’s nuclear and ballistic missile programs were two main topics the Bush administration had 
to address.  The continuation of the Agreed Framework talks was a move to increase the 
effectiveness of the agreement.  The creation of the Proliferation Security Initiative was another 
accomplishment of the Bush administration aimed at preventing the spread of weapons of mass 
destruction.  However, North Korea’s first nuclear test in 2006 raised eyebrows at North Korea’s 
entrance into the exclusive “nuclear club.”   




 Bush came into office following Clinton’s efforts with the Agreed Framework and the 
Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty.  The Bush administration wanted to continue the Agreed 
Framework and suggested filling in the gaps of the original framework.  The original framework 
under Clinton did not deal with North Korea’s ballistic missile program, so Secretary of State 
Colin Powell urged the adding of ballistic missiles to the agreement in 2002 (Cha, “Nuclear 
North” 139).  North Korea saw the latest action as against the national interest of the country.  In 
the response, North Korea sought a non-aggression treaty with the U.S. before continuing 
discussions about the nuclear and ballistic missile programs.  The Bush administration was not 
willing to issue a non-aggression treaty with North Korea, but the administration verbally 
reassured North Korea that there were no intentions to invade the country.  North Korea was not 
satisfied with a verbal assurance, and the discussions led to a stalemate between the U.S. and 
North Korea because no side was willing to back down on its demands.  North Korea removed 
itself from the NPT in 2003, which contributed to the fall of the Agreed Framework.   
 Moderate observers like David Kang argue that the Bush administration’s unwillingness 
to hold a diplomatic dialogue with North Korea in his early years in office was a fault of his 
administration (Cha, “Nuclear North” 147).  Kang opts for a more open dialogue with North 
Korea, despite failed efforts in the past.  On the other hand, Victor Cha disagrees by saying the 
U.S. should not use the strategy of appeasement following the breakdown of the Agreed 
Framework (Cha, “Nuclear North” 160). 
Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) 
 
 On May 31, 2003, President Bush called for the creation of the Proliferation Security 
Initiative (PSI) with an “aim to stop trafficking of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), their 
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delivery systems, and related materials to and from states and non-state actors of proliferation 
concern” (“Proliferation”).  This agreement called for the interception of ships suspected of 
carrying weapons of mass destruction.  The U.S. and over 90 other countries have agreed to the 
conditions of the PSI, but South Korea originally refused to join the PSI because of “unique 
geopolitical situations” (“S. Korea).  South Korea feared that if it joined the PSI, it would 
complicate relations with North Korea.  The PSI naturally angered North Korea since it was the 
primary target of the agreement, even though the PSI did not specifically state North Korea as 
the intended target.  Elections in South Korea led to a shift in power to the opposition party, and 
South Korea agreed to join the PSI in May 2009.  North Korea called South Korea’s joining of 
the PSI “tantamount to a declaration of war” (“S. Korea”).  Furthermore, North Korea’s state-run 
news agency released the following statement: “The PSI is a mechanism for a war of aggression 
built by the U.S. against the DPRK under the pretext of intercepting and blockading ships and 
planes, etc. suspicious of transporting weapons of mass destruction including nuclear weapons 
and missiles” (“CPRK”).  The outrage by North Korea was expected, but the results of the PSI’s 
creation remained limited to a verbal confrontation rather than a physical conflict.  With South 
Korea’s joining of the PSI, the U.S. and South Korea improved relations in the Obama 
administration.  The Bush administration was able to set the agenda for the PSI to help prevent 
the spread of weapons of mass destruction by North Korea.    
 Did the Bush administration’s efforts regarding the PSI work?  Opinions of the PSI’s 
effectiveness vary, but it is worth an examination of the tangible results of the agreement.  In 
2005, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice stated publicly that the PSI’s member countries 
intercepted shipments of weapons of mass destruction in twelve instances, two of which involved 
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North Korea (Valencia 17).  Critics of the PSI say a UN coalition of countries would be more 
effective than the current PSI led by the United States.  A UN coalition could broaden 
international views of intercepting foreign ships; however, a UN coalition would face the same 
difficulties of getting China and Indonesia involved in intercepting ships suspected of carrying 
weapons of mass destruction (Valencia 18).  A UN coalition would continue to have opponents 
as well, so no single authoritative body would provide a 100% solution to raiding foreign ships at 
sea.  The PSI was a first step, but the agreement’s main goal was preventing the shipment of 
weapons of mass destruction components to other entities.  The PSI did not cover the question of 
North Korea’s domestic nuclear weapons program, only the shipment of its components 
internationally.   
First Nuclear Test 
 
North Korea’s first nuclear test was not a complete surprise because it has a history of 
developing nuclear weapons despite attempts by the United States and the international 
community to prevent the country from obtaining nuclear weapons.  North Korea officially 
conducted its first underground nuclear weapons test on October 9, 2006, but the test was 
deemed a fizzle by international observers.  According to seismic readings following the blast, 
the test had a magnitude range of between 4.0 and 4.2, which meant the test was low yield or a 
fizzle (Kalinowski).  Nevertheless, the nuclear test made it clear to the international community 
that North Korea was serious about developing and improving its nuclear weapons capability.  
The 2006 test was just a first step on the road to becoming a full-fledged nuclear state. 
The Bush administration had several options for responding to North Korea’s nuclear 
tests.  The test itself was not enough to call for immediate military action.  What type of response 
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was necessary to prevent North Korea from further developing its nuclear weapons capabilities?  
The answer depends on the observer’s point of view regarding the nuclear issue.  In the past, 
observers feared the possible consequences of countries like China, India, and Pakistan 
developing nuclear weapons, but all three countries refrained from using nuclear weapons in 
hostile ways.  The nuclear weapons in China, India, and Pakistan contributed to deterrence, but 
the overall concerns decreased.  Despite never using nuclear weapons in a hostile manner, a key 
concept is the question of who controls the nuclear weapons.  For instance, instability in Pakistan 
leads to concerns about the safety of its nuclear weapons.  If the government were to fall, who 
would get their hands on the nuclear weapons?  The Pakistani government claims it has 
safeguards in place to prevent the nuclear weapons from falling into the wrong hands.   
North Korea obtaining nuclear weapons does not make it an immediate threat to some 
observers, but North Korea’s intentions for having nuclear weapons are unknown.  Perhaps the 
nuclear weapons are just another way for North Korea to obtain concessions from the 
international community?  This intention is the least worrisome because of the diminished threat 
to the region, but the added deterrence of nuclear weapons increases the possibility of foreign 
countries giving aid to North Korea.  On the other hand, does North Korea really intend to use 
the nuclear weapons in an offensive manner against another country?  This intention is 
dangerous because it would lead to instability in the region.  Once again, it is unclear what will 
happen with North Korea’s nuclear weapons program, but a big fear is the possibility of North 
Korea selling its nuclear technology to other rogue states or entities like terrorist groups.   
Another aspect to consider about North Korea’s development of nuclear weapons is the 
concept of a delivery system.  North Korea does not appear to have a tested and reliable delivery 
 39 
 
system for the nuclear weapon, specifically intercontinental ballistic missiles capable of reaching 
the United States.  Even if North Korea places the nuclear warhead on one of its more reliable 
short to medium range missiles, the country lacks the development of a nuclear warhead small 
enough to fit on the delivery system.  It will take time for North Korea to develop both a nuclear 
warhead and a delivery system for the nuclear warhead.   
The Bush administration responded to the nuclear test by increasing economic sanctions 
on North Korea based on the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1718 (Hiemann).  As 
with many sanctions, it is important for all players involved to contribute to the sanctions.  
However, China and South Korea did not carry out its prescribed sanctions and refused 
participation in the PSI (Hiemann).  Therefore, the sanctions did not lead to any lasting changes 
regarding North Korea’s nuclear weapons program.    
Other Negotiations 
 
 Foreign policy observers, including Hiemann, Kwak, and Joo, agree that the Bush 
administration shifted its foreign policy approach to North Korea following the 2006 nuclear test.  
The Bush administration attempted to get North Korea to join the NPT again, but the attempts 
failed.  Members of the Six Party Talks agreed to the Denuclearization Action Plan in February 
2007, which showed the Bush administration’s willingness to negotiate with the regime 
(Hiemann).  Previously, the Bush administration took a tough stance and was not willing to 
change its demands.  The Denuclearization Action Plan had the goal of ending North Korea’s 
nuclear program in two proposed phases: initial and disablement phases (Kwak and Joo 92).  In 
return for cooperation, North Korea would receive foreign aid (mostly oil) and a promise of 
removal from the list of terrorism (Kwak and Joo 92).  However, the U.S. was not pleased with 
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North Korea’s cooperation and transparency regarding the dismantlement of its nuclear weapons 
program.  North Korea cited the lack of promised foreign aid as a reason for not cooperating 
fully.  The members of the six parties met again in October 2007 in an effort to reach an 
agreement about North Korea’s nuclear program.  North Korea agreed to the discussions 
concerning the shutdown of the Yongbyon reactor and being more transparent in the dismantling 
of its nuclear weapons program (Joo and Kwak 93).  The Yongbyon reactor’s main cooling 
tower was demolished the following year, and large amounts of foreign aid entered North Korea 
because of its cooperation. 
Opinions of the Bush Administration 
 
 Victor Cha, a member of Bush’s National Security Council, views himself as a hawk 
while he served under the Bush administration.  Cha reasons that being a hawk is not all about an 
engagement with North Korea.  Instead, Cha advised the Bush administration to send aid to 
North Korea to influence the people’s will to fight against the regime (“Korea’s place in the axis” 
84).  Aid in itself is intended for the people of North Korea rather than the leaders.  While the 
likelihood of the aid causing people to rise up against Kim Jong-il’s authoritarian regime is slim, 
the humanitarian aspect of the aid would help improve the well-being of the North Koreans 
facing scarcity of food.  Cha does not focus only on aid to North Korea; he also advocates a 
method of obtaining peace through strength (“Korea’s place in the axis” 85).  This refers to the 
development of a missile shield against a North Korean threat while negotiating with the North 
Korea government at the same time.  The missile defense system would defend not only the 
United States, but also the two main allies South Korea and Japan.  Cha believes it would 
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enhance the U.S. bargaining position since North Korean missiles would become less effective 
against the intended targets (“Korea’s place in the axis” 85). 
 While Victor Cha and David Kang favored an engagement strategy with North Korea, 
there are several other foreign policy options the Bush administration had in dealing with North 
Korea.  On the extreme side of engagement is the option of military force.  According to U.S. 
News and World Report, Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld had his commanders develop a plan for 
a war with North Korea (Richardson 42).  While being prepared for a possible war would make 
the country ready for an immediate response if needed, the concept of going to war carries 
serious consequences.  Commander of U.S. Forces Korea General Luck estimated one trillion 
dollars in economic damage and another one million casualties if a war were to break out on the 
Korean peninsula (Richardson 43).   
James Laney, former U.S. ambassador to South Korea, advocated a moderate strategy of 
negotiation with the secretive regime.  His plan called for an assurance of North Korean security 
while ensuring the dismantling of North Korea’s nuclear program with verification (Richardson 
41).  This moderate option is a promising solution since North Korea has been pushing for a non-
aggression pact with the U.S. for the past several years.  Yet, North Korea’s unwillingness to 
allow inspectors into the country to verify its nuclear weapons program is troubling.  In the past 
when North Korea showed signs of allowing inspectors into the country, the country would find 
a way to circumvent the inspections by removing questionable material.   
On the opposite side of going to war, there is the strategy of appeasement.  However, 
appeasement has a negative connotation dating back to the Munich Conference with Adolf Hitler 
regarding Czechoslovakia.  Appeasing North Korea could cause the country to work undercover 
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by selling its weapon technology to other rogue states or terrorists (Richardson 43).  The PSI was 
created to prevent the transfer of this weapon technology to outside entities.  Otherwise, 
appeasement toward North Korea did not appear to be a suitable solution for foreign policy 
under the Bush administration, and for that matter, other presidential administrations as well. 
The Bush Administration Conclusion 
 
President Bush initially took an aggressive stance toward North Korea’s defiance 
surrounding the Agreed Framework, but changed its strategy following North Korea’s nuclear 
tests.  Nonetheless, there were few substantial changes in U.S. foreign relations other than a 
more open willingness to negotiate.  In December 2008, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice 
commented, “You’d have to be an idiot to trust the North Koreans” (Cha, “U.S. Korea 
Relations”).  This statement sums up what the Bush administration learned about negotiating 
with North Korea during his two terms in office.  The period from 2007-2008 had a continuation 
of the Six Party Talks regarding the dismantling of North Korea’s nuclear program in return for 
offers of foreign aid.  Both the U.S. and North Korea did not have complete trust in the other 
side’s promises.  By 2008, the Six Party Talks led to tangible results with the demolishing of the 
Yongbyon reactor in North Korea.   
 In a final effort to improve relations with North Korea before leaving office, the Bush 
administration removed the country from the U.S. government’s list of state sponsors of 
terrorism (Manyin 4).  In return, North Korea agreed on verification of its plutonium program 
(Manyin 4).  The U.S. removal of North Korea from the terrorism list was viewed negatively by 
Japan due to the ongoing kidnapping issue.  Furthermore, the removal may signal approval of 
North Korea’s history of hostile actions against the U.S. and foreign countries, and it is possible 
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that further hostile actions will continue.  Despite the Bush administration’s efforts, the incoming 
Obama administration will have to take the reins in guiding the Six Party Talks or perhaps taking 




CHAPTER SIX – PRESENT CHALLENGES FOR PRESIDENT BARACK 
OBAMA 
 
 Almost immediately after President Barack Obama came into office, the Obama 
administration was forced to handle the ongoing dealings with North Korea.  The previous 
presidential administrations had set a foundation for U.S. foreign policy, but each president can 
change the direction of policy.  President Obama wants to continue focusing on multilateral 
diplomacy based on the Six Party Talks comprising of China, Japan, Russia, South Korea, North 
Korea, and the United States.  The Obama administration hopes the discussions will lead toward 
an ultimate goal of denuclearizing North Korea and ensuring stability in the region.  However, in 
light of hostile actions performed by North Korea since Obama took office, the president must 
make modifications to his plan based on the circumstances.  With tensions rising on the Korean 
peninsula, it is important for President Obama to determine the best possible solution for 
lowering tensions with minimal conflict if possible. 
Hostile Actions 
 
 North Korea has a long history of conducting hostile actions during previous presidential 
administrations.  It continued with its record of hostile actions once President Obama came into 
office.  While some of these hostile actions involved the United States directly, such as the 
capture of U.S. citizens along North Korea’s border, other actions affected the U.S. indirectly, 
such as the sinking of the South Korean warship Cheonan or the bombing of Yeonpyeong Island.  
North Korea also continued testing of intercontinental ballistic missiles and nuclear weapons 
during the Obama administration. 
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Capture of U.S. Citizens 
 
 Citizens of the United States who strayed too close to North Korea’s border face capture 
and sentencing by North Korea’s government.  While this issue is not necessarily a national 
security threat, the involvement of U.S. citizens garners the attention of the presidential 
administration in power.  On March 17, 2009, North Korean guards captured two American 
journalists, Euna Lee and Laura Ling, claiming they trespassed into North Korean territory.  
North Korea sentenced the two journalists to twelve years of hard labor for “hostilities against 
the Korean nation and illegal entry” (Bosland).  In January 2010, North Korea arrested Aijalon 
Mahli Gomes for trespassing into North Korea and sentenced him to eight years of hard labor 
(Sang-Hun).   
Launch of the Taepodong-2 
 
North Korea first tested the Taepodong-2 long-range ballistic missile in 2006 during the 
Bush administration, but the test was unsuccessful.  On April 5, 2009, North Korea conducted a 
second test of the Taepodong-2 carrying a payload called Kwangmyŏngsŏng-2.  North Korea 
maintained the payload and launch were for peaceful purposes, but the United States remained 
skeptical of the test’s ultimate motive.  The U.S. saw the possibility of North Korea attaching a 
warhead to the Taepodong-2 in the future.  Furthermore, portions of the Western United States 
were within the maximum range of the Taeopodong-2 (“North Korea Space Launch”).  North 
Korea maintained that the Taepodong-2’s payload made it into orbit successfully, but 
international observers questioned the test’s success (“North Korea Space Launch”).  The test 
increased tensions in the region once again due to the threat of the rocket flying over another 
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country and dropping debris.  Around the same time, North Korea also restarted plans to enrich 
uranium to levels needed for a nuclear bomb.  
Second Test of a Nuclear Device 
 
Only a month after test firing the Taepodong-2, North Korea conducted a second 
underground nuclear weapons test on May 25, 2009.  While the first test in 2006 was a fizzle, the 
2009 test showed that North Korea learned from the first test and improved the effectiveness of 
the device (Charles and Tabassu).  Nonetheless, there are conflicting reports from various 
governments and organizations regarding the yield of the 2009 test.  The Comprehensive Test 
Ban Treaty Organization said the yield was only slightly higher than the 2006 test, but Russia 
said the yield was 20 kilotons, which is roughly equivalent to the atomic bomb dropped on 
Nagasaki, Japan in World War II (Charles and Tabassu).  The real yield is likely between the two 
estimates, but the 2009 test is viewed as more of a success than the 2006 test.  Despite the test’s 
questionable success, it could take significantly longer for North Korea to develop an effective 
delivery system such as a nuclear warhead capable of fitting onto a ballistic missile.  
Nevertheless, the underground nuclear tests are enough for North Korea to join the exclusive 
group of countries possessing nuclear weapons.  The threat of a North Korean nuclear weapon is 
enough to provide deterrence against a foreign attack.  This is something that the Obama 
administration must take into account in its considerations of North Korea. 
Sale of Arms to Terrorist Groups and Foreign Entities 
 
North Korea has long been under suspicion of providing aid to foreign terrorist groups 
such as Hezbollah in Lebanon, the Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka, and the Iranian Revolutionary 
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Guard (Manyin 20).  North Korea also reportedly sold arms to Iran, Libya, Pakistan, and Syria 
(Triplett 197).  Both the Clinton and Bush administrations made efforts to remove North Korea 
from the terrorism list, but only the Bush administration succeeded in removing it from the 
terrorism list.  Since North Korea’s removal from the terrorism list, new reports of North Korean 
support to terrorist groups have emerged.   
At Bangkok airport in December 2009, investigators seized an Ilyushin-T74 from 
Pyongyang with 35 tons of arms shipments destined for Iran (Manyin 21).  The weapons 
included rocket launchers, shoulder-launched missiles, and other arms components which would 
likely have gone through Iran and eventually to Hezbollah or Hamas for use in attacks against 
Israel (Manyin 21).    
In 2007, Japan’s Sankei Shimbun reported arms shipments to the Tamil Tigers in Sri 
Lanka.  Sri Lankan officials searched North Korean ships and found all types of conventional 
arms including machine guns and rocket launchers (Manyin 24).  The PSI allowed for the 
searching of North Korean ships suspected of transporting weapons of mass destruction and arms 
components. 
Once again, these actions by North Korea do not directly affect the United States, but 
preventing the spread of terrorism is a goal of U.S. foreign policy, especially attacks against 
Israel, a key U.S. ally in the Middle East.  Furthermore, the selling of arms and technology to 
foreign entities allowed North Korea to obtain a source of foreign income.  If the U.S. could stop 
the sale of arms from North Korea, it would eliminate a portion of the country’s income for use 
in developing and improving nuclear weapons or ballistic missiles.  The Obama administration 
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must take into account these new reports of terrorist support in developing his foreign policy 
toward North Korea.   
Sinking of a South Korean Warship 
 
Tensions on the Korean peninsula continued to escalate during the Obama administration 
with the sinking of the South Korean naval ship, Cheonan, on March 26, 2010.  An international 
investigation pointed to a North Korean torpedo that exploded near the ship and caused the 
sinking (Charles, “Seoul”).  The sinking caused the deaths of 46 South Korean sailors, along 
with injuries to 56 sailors (Charles, “Seoul”).  Although this incident did not directly involve the 
United States, the ship belonged to the South Korean Navy, a key U.S. ally in the region.  The 
Cheonan sinking increased tensions between North and South Korea.  The sinking of another 
country’s naval ship is usually an act of war, but North Korea maintains a level of deterrence 
with its ballistic missile and nuclear program.  Furthermore, North Korea’s large army, although 
not well equipped by modern standards, is still a considerable foe if ground fighting were to 
commence on the Korean peninsula.   
Attack on Yeonpyeong Island 
 
 On November 23, 2010, North Korea fired artillery shells toward the South Korean island 
of Yeonpyeong, thereby increasing tensions to the highest point since the Korean War.  Two 
South Korean marines and two civilians were killed in the attack while fifteen soldiers and three 
civilians were wounded (Sung-ki).  The island’s civilian residents quickly evacuated the island, 
as they feared for their safety.  North Korea claimed South Korea was responsible for initiating 
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the attack by firing artillery during a training exercise into waters claimed by North Korea 
(Powell). 
Why would North Korea fire on South Korea at this time?  There are several possible 
reasons why North Korea is becoming more aggressive.  The first scenario is the North feels 
threatened by U.S. and South Korea’s joint military exercises in the Yellow Sea (Powell).  The 
North expressed the threat of an imminent invasion by the U.S. and South Korea, although it is 
unlikely.  It is also doubtful that North Korea used this as a preemptive attack because of the 
superiority of the South Korean and U.S. militaries.  Another scenario is a power struggle in 
North Korea involving Kim Jong-un, the successor to his father Kim Jong-il (Powell).   
The Obama Administration’s Options and Decisions 
 
 The Obama administration faced several obstacles regarding his intent to continue the Six 
Party Talks with North Korea.  The hostile actions performed by North Korea threatened to 
hinder his planned diplomatic negotiations.  With the aid of advisors, the president had to 
consider his options for responding to these acts of hostility and make the final decision about 
the path of U.S. foreign policy in the near future.   
Response to the Capture of U.S. Citizens 
 
The Obama administration tried to determine the best method for obtaining the release of 
the two journalists Euna Lee and Laura Ling.  Secretary of State Clinton sent a letter to North 
Korea apologizing for the actions of the two journalists and asking for their release (Boland).  
However, the U.S. was not able to obtain immediate release of the journalists as a result of the 
apology.  Over a year later, an envoy under former President Clinton flew to North Korea to 
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discuss the issue with its leaders.  North Korea agreed to release the journalists after Clinton’s 
visit.  In August 2010, the same type of diplomacy was used when former President Carter 
visited North Korea to obtain the release of Aijalon Mahli Gomes, another American citizen who 
trespassed into North Korea.  This type of diplomacy appears effective in gaining the release of 
U.S. prisoners, but it fails to address the larger issues of North Korea’s ballistic missile and 
nuclear weapons program.  Other governments in the region including Japan may feel left out 
since North Korea allegedly continues to hold Japanese citizens hostage.  A motive for North 
Korea to release the American hostages is the additional publicity of former high-ranking U.S. 
officials visiting the country.  It allows North Korea to show off the legitimacy of their 
government in dealing with foreign countries in a formal situation.   
Response to the Taepodong-2 Launch 
 
The Obama administration watched the Taepodong-2 launch closely along with top U.S. 
military officials.  The U.S. Northern Command remained confident that the launch did not 
threaten the U.S. mainland or Hawaii; thus, the U.S. took no defensive military action other than 
remaining on alert (“North Korea Space Launch”).  President Obama released a statement 
condemning the launch of the Taepodong-2 ballistic missile.  Obama cited the United Nations 
Security Council Resolution 1718 that prohibits North Korea from developing ballistic missiles 
(Wooley, “Statement on the Situation”).  The president reassured his commitment to blocking 
the development of any weapons of mass destruction in North Korea.  He also remained 
committed to the Six Party Talks for solving the problem.  Besides the presidential statement, the 
U.S. did not respond with any other actions against North Korea such as economic sanctions. 
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Response to the Second Nuclear Test 
 
North Korea’s second nuclear test a month after the ballistic missile test prompted the 
Obama administration to release another statement calling the nuclear test a violation of 
international law and again mentioning the ballistic missile threat (Woolley, “Remarks on the 
Situation”).  The Obama administration chose to rely on the United Nations Resolution 1874, 
which called for sanctions against North Korea and continuing the arms embargo on the country 
(Nanto 7).  Both China and Russia agreed to Resolution 1874, including the clause prohibiting 
the export of luxury goods to North Korea.  However, China continued the export of luxury 
goods at levels equivalent prior to the resolution, which raised questions about the effectiveness 
of Resolution 1874 (Nanto 7).  Despite these two hostile actions by North Korea, Obama 
remained committed to the Six Party Talks and creating an agreement with North Korea.  Once 
again, the administration took no significant action other than the harsh rhetoric.   
Response to the Sale of Arms to Terrorist Groups and Foreign Entities 
 
The Obama administration has not made any firm decisions yet about North Korea’s 
support of terrorist groups despite the breach of UN Resolution 1874 prohibiting the export of 
arms.  After the seizure of arms intended for Hezbollah, the U.S. State Department saw no need 
to add North Korea back to the terrorism list (Manyin 2).  There is an ongoing debate in 
Washington D.C. about whether to add North Korea to the list of state sponsors of terrorism.  
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton stated in an interview that she was willing to reconsider adding 
North Korea to the list again (Finn).  President Obama, however, saw no need to add North 
Korea to the list of state sponsors based on a February 3, 2010, report to congressional leaders 
stating, “[North Korea] does not meet the statutory criteria to again be designated as a state 
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sponsor of terrorism” (“Letter to Congressional”).  Adding North Korea to the list of official 
state sponsors of terrorism is merely a formality, but it would reinforce the idea of North Korea 
being a rogue state.  However, there is also the possibility that North Korea would demand 
removal before continuing with negotiations.   
Response to the Sinking of a South Korean Warship 
 
Following the Cheonan sinking, the U.S. and South Korea announced joint naval 
exercises in the Sea of Japan to show off their forces, strengthen military ties, and increase 
deterrence against North Korea.  Knowing North Korea’s own deterrence, the Obama 
administration had to walk a fine line in its actions hoping not to provoke further conflict.  In 
typical defiance, the North Korean government condemned the joint U.S. and South Korean 
naval exercises as a show of aggression (Cloud).  For the Obama administration, the joint 
military exercises were a good way to show off U.S. and South Korean forces without causing a 
war.  Without the show of military force, North Korea could get comfortable with the idea of 
sinking foreign ships.  U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and Secretary of Defense Robert 
Gates visited the demilitarized zone briefly after the sinking.  During their visit, the two Cabinet 
members reiterated the U.S. commitment to defend South Korea from any acts of North Korean 
aggression (Cloud).  Secretary of State Clinton announced additional sanctions against North 
Korea hoping to block the flow of money used for North Korea’s nuclear program without 
hurting the people of North Korea (Cloud).  Clinton also emphasized the need to enforce the 




Response to the Attack on Yeonpyeong Island 
 
 To denote the urgency of the situation, presidential staff woke President Obama at 3AM 
following the North Korean attack on Yeonpyeong Island (Powell).  Obama spoke with South 
Korean President Lee Myung-bak over the telephone and expressed outrage at the attack.  With 
30,000 U.S. military personnel stationed in South Korea, the U.S. reaffirmed its commitment to 
protecting South Korea from a North Korean invasion (Laney).  The U.S. Navy sent the nuclear-
powered aircraft carrier USS George Washington and several destroyers to the Yellow Sea for 
joint military exercises with the South Korean Navy.  As with previous hostile events, the 
President’s options were limited.   
One major option considered is relying on China to put pressure on North Korea to end 
these hostile actions.  Secretary of State Clinton and U.S. lawmakers have expressed publicly the 
need for China to play a major role in negotiations with North Korea.  U.S. Senator John McCain 
of Arizona said, “They [China] could bring the North Korean economy to its knees if they 
wanted to” (Leney).  Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Michael Mullen also urged 
China to take a leading role regarding North Korea (Leney).  Trying to influence China is a 
relatively peaceful option if the Chinese are willing to use their ties with North Korea as a way to 
stop further hostile actions.  Thus far, China has shown mixed signs of continuing its existing 
policy or removing its support from the North Korean regime.  Following the Cheonan sinking, 
China refused to go against North Korea or punish it for the hostile action (Bajoria).  China 
thought both North Korea and South Korea should do a better job of ensuring peace (Powell).  
However, President Hu Jintao of China later urged North Korea to stop its hostile actions 
(Bajoria).   China also called for emergency talks among the six parties following the 
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Yeonpyeong Island attack (Leney).  China appears unwilling to break its close ties with North 
Korea, but at the same time, it realizes the need to encourage a lowering of tensions in the region.  
China does not intend to increase instability in North Korea; therefore, the option of using China 
as a go-between in diplomatic talks has mixed opinions.   
Another option for dealing with this situation was a surgical airstrike against North 
Korean artillery positions (Cha, “What Do They”).  While neither side may want a war, further 
conflict was certainly possible if North Korea continues to commit acts of aggression against 
South Korea.  President Obama chose to exercise restraint following the Yeonpyeong Island 
incident, and he encouraged President Myung-bak to exercise restraint as well.  However, a 
future attack on South Korea would likely mean some form of military retaliation by the South 
Koreans. 
President Obama’s Cabinet members echoed the same response to the hostile actions as 
the president himself.  They felt that Obama needed a different direction of foreign policy 
compared to the carrots and sticks methods of the Clinton and Bush administrations.  However, it 
is too early to tell if there will be any significant results from the Obama administration’s foreign 
policy toward North Korea. 
Opinions of the Obama Administration 
 
Victor Cha says Obama has positioned the U.S. well both for a negotiation and sanctions 
track (“What Do They Really Want” 128).  Like prior presidential administrations, the Obama 
administration has chosen to make economic sanctions a key policy against North Korea.  At the 
same time, Obama continues to emphasize the need for the Six Party Talks and coming to an 
agreement about North Korea’s nuclear and ballistic missile program.  Even so, the numerous 
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acts of North Korean hostility committed during the Obama administration threaten to 
complicate the negotiations among the six parties.   
A report by the Congressional Research Service suggests the reasoning for the increase of 
hostile actions since 2009 is an effort to shift North Korean power to the military in the midst of 
Kim Jong-il’s succession (Nanto).  Furthermore, the CRS Report points out the upcoming 100th 
birthday of Kim Il-sung in 2012 as a second reason for the recent increase in hostile actions 
(Nanto).  By the early part of 2011, the level of hostile actions by North Korea has diminished 
once again, but it is certainly possible for North Korea to conduct another public demonstration 
of its power by 2012.   
Future Relations with North Korea 
 
The Obama administration has the task of setting the foundation for future relations with 
North Korea.  One aspect to consider is the passing of North Korean power to the next 
generation.  Kim Jong-il’s health in recent years appears to be declining and steps to groom the 
next leader, Kim Jong-un, are apparently well underway in the secretive regime of North Korea.  
The immediate impact on U.S. foreign policy is not known, but it is definitely an issue that either 
the Obama administration or future presidential administrations need to consider. 
North Korea’s ballistic missile and nuclear program threaten to complicate future talks to 
improve relations between the U.S. and North Korea.  North Korea’s motives for possessing a 
nuclear weapon and ballistic missile capability are not fully understood.  Scholars can only 
debate about North Korea’s intentions for possessing long-range missiles and nuclear weapons.  
One possibility is that the nuclear capability is just a means for setting serious negotiations with 
South Korea, Japan, and the United States.  Prior to North Korea’s nuclear weapons, the country 
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had to commit other acts of aggression such as capturing the USS Pueblo and shooting down a 
U.S. reconnaissance aircraft to gain international attention.  While North Korea is still active in 
pursuing acts of aggression, the aggression is now backed by a nuclear deterrence.  Thus, U.S. 
military options against North Korea would be difficult due to North Korea’s large army, 
ballistic missile program, and nuclear capability.  This leaves the U.S. and other regional powers 
with few choices in pursuing relations with North Korea.  Perhaps North Korea just wants to 
gain concessions from diplomatic negotiations with regional powers.  However, the danger lies 
in the fact that no one other than North Korea’s leaders truly knows the intentions of possessing 
nuclear weapons.  North Korea’s intentions might not be limited to peaceful negotiations and 
gaining concessions; it may also be interested in selling its nuclear and ballistic missile 
technology to other rogue states or even terrorists.  There is suspicion that North Korea has 
assisted Syria with the development and construction of a nuclear reactor in 2007 (Triplett 197).  
Nuclear weapons or ballistic missiles falling into the wrong hands could lead to further trouble 
internationally.  Therefore, it is important for the Obama administration and future presidential 
administrations to take into account the array of possibilities.   
The Obama administration has chosen to continue with the Six Party Talks in the hope of 
improving relations with North Korea.  It is too early to determine whether the Obama 
administration’s negotiations will cause an improvement in relations.  Just as the presidential 
administrations before Obama, the likelihood of North Korea committing future acts of 
aggression is high.  Furthermore, the threat of a nuclear-armed North Korea remains, so the next 




CHAPTER SEVEN – CONCLUSION 
 
 U.S. foreign policy toward North Korea shows no clear signs of improvement in the near 
future.  The entire history of foreign policy toward North Korea was filled with hostility, 
uncertainty, and defiance.  From the very founding of the DPRK to the present, it is difficult for 
presidential administrations to choose the appropriate method for responding to acts of hostility 
while attempting to maintain peace on the Korean peninsula.  The Truman and Eisenhower 
administrations dealt with North Korea’s invasion of South Korea and the consequences of the 
conflict. 
Both the Johnson and Nixon administrations had options of military retaliation to the 
Pueblo and the EC-121 crises, but both administrations practiced restraint to avoid escalation.  
The use of military force carries instant gratification, but it also has a risk of escalating the crisis 
to a large-scale war.  Johnson, and most certainly Nixon, considered military responses to North 
Korean provocations, but neither administration chose a military response.  At the time, the risks 
of using military force outweighed the benefits of retaliation.   
 Moving forward to the Clinton and Bush administrations brought new challenges to U.S. 
foreign policy.  North Korea began development and production of ballistic missiles along with 
plans for a nuclear weapons program.  Diplomatic talks about North Korea’s nuclear program 
resulted in agreements like the Agreed Framework, and it looked as if North Korea was willing 
to cooperate.  However, as it turned out, the agreements about North Korea’s nuclear programs 
lacked substantial, long-term results.  The threat of nuclear weapons remained throughout the 
rest of the Clinton and Bush administrations. 
 58 
 
 The Obama administration has many obstacles to deal with in addition to the questions 
surrounding North Korea’s nuclear weapons and ballistic missile programs.  Obama appears 
committed to the Six Party Talks while attempting to keep the situation on the Korean peninsula 
from escalating.  In an attempt to lower tensions, the Obama administration is focusing on 
getting North Korea’s ally, China, involved in persuading North Korea to stop its provocative 
actions.  China certainly has a better ability to influence North Korea compared to the United 
States, but it is unclear how tough of a stance it will take against North Korea.   
 The various presidential administrations since Truman walked a fine line when 
responding to North Korea’s demands or acts of provocation.  In spite of the level of tensions at 
times, no administration has responded to North Korea’s actions with military force since 
Truman and Eisenhower.  Instead, each president chose restraint and diplomatic solutions to 
North Korea in order to maintain peace and stability in the region.  In reality, no side may want a 
large-scale war because of the resources required and the general instability caused by war.  For 
instance, about a quarter of North Korea’s GDP goes toward defense spending, which causes 
obstacles to maintaining the well-being of its citizens (“CIA”).  Food shortages and scarcity of 
electricity are common throughout the country, and a war would only increase the strain on 
North Korea’s weak infrastructure.  As the succession of power begins to take place in North 
Korea, it is easy to remain hopeful that relations between the United States and North Korea will 
improve.  However, hopes should never be too high as witnessed by the transfer of power from 
Kim Il-sung to Kim Jong-il in 1994.  Nevertheless, U.S. foreign policy toward North Korea will 
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